Group lying with negative externality

Lan Yao and Chong Zhou

International Studies of Economics, 2023, vol. 18, issue 2, 184-192

Abstract: We use a modified die‐rolling experiment to study whether negative externality affects a group's decisions about whether to cheat. Our results show that group members are less likely to lie when faced with a passive out‐group player only if two members of the group share an unequal payment for lying. The less‐paid party in the group plays a dominant role in the honest decision by proposing the true number more frequently in arguments for group coordination.

Date: 2023
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https://doi.org/10.1002/ise3.37

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:intsec:v:18:y:2023:i:2:p:184-192

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