Screening Discrimination in a Broader Context

James Fain ()

Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and Management, 2016, vol. 23, issue 4, 276-294

Abstract: I employ simulations to investigate the impact of screening discrimination, which addresses discrimination in hiring. I extend a well‐known model of screening discrimination by including minority firms, wages, worker preferences and competition among the firms for workers. The Gale–Shapley algorithm is used to find a stable matching of heterogeneous workers to heterogeneous firms. Screening discrimination gives majority applicants an advantage in the hiring process, but this advantage is reduced by the presence of minority firms. In this broader context, screening discrimination produces segregated firms but has little impact on median wages or employment probabilities. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2016
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/isaf.1388

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:isacfm:v:23:y:2016:i:4:p:276-294

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1099-1174

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and Management from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().