Estimation and comparison of treasury auction formats when bidders are asymmetric

Olivier Armantier and Erwann Sbai

Journal of Applied Econometrics, 2006, vol. 21, issue 6, 745-779

Abstract: The structural parameters of a share‐auction model accounting for asymmetries across bidders, as well as supply uncertainty, are estimated with a sample of French Treasury auctions. We find evidence of both informational and risk aversion asymmetries across bidders. A counter‐factual analysis also suggests that, in the context of the French Treasury auctions, a shift from the discriminatory to the uniform‐price format would simultaneously benefit the French Treasury and the auctions' participants. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2006
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https://doi.org/10.1002/jae.875

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Journal Article: Estimation and comparison of treasury auction formats when bidders are asymmetric (2006)
Working Paper: Estimation and Comparison of Treasury Auction Formats when Bidders are Asymmetric (2003)
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