Regional, individual and political determinants of FOMC members' key macroeconomic forecasts

Stefan Eichler and Tom Lähner

Journal of Forecasting, 2018, vol. 37, issue 1, 119-132

Abstract: We study Federal Open Market Committee members' individual forecasts of inflation and unemployment in the period 1992–2004. Our results imply that Governors and Bank presidents forecast differently, with Governors submitting lower inflation and higher unemployment rate forecasts than bank presidents. For Bank presidents we find a regional bias, with higher district unemployment rates being associated with lower inflation and higher unemployment rate forecasts. Bank presidents' regional bias is more pronounced during the year prior to their elections or for nonvoting bank presidents. Career backgrounds or political affiliations also affect individual forecast behavior.

Date: 2018
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https://doi.org/10.1002/for.2481

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jforec:v:37:y:2018:i:1:p:119-132

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