EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Conditionality covenants: Commitment versus discretion in sovereign credit contracts

Sherif Khalifa

Journal of International Development, 2010, vol. 22, issue 4, 411-423

Abstract: This paper investigates the impact of imposing conditionality covenants on the performance of the signatories to a sovereign credit contract. A two period model is developed in which creditors provide a loan to a sovereign conditional upon the implementation of investments. Commitment to these covenants overcome the debt repudiation problem, as it increases the likelihood of repayment, if the implemented conditionalities contribute to an increase in the sovereign's productive capacity. A three period model is also developed to entertain the possibility that the sovereign engage in credit activities in subsequent periods, where in the final period the debtor has obligations towards junior and senior creditors. This allows for dynamic inconsistency, as the sovereign may be tempted to increase its debt in the second period, thus increasing the probability of repudiation in the third period. Imposing conditionality covenants by senior creditors that increase the portion they can appropriate in case of repudiation, relative to junior creditors, reduces the supply of credit by junior creditors in the second period and thus overcomes the debt dilution problem. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2010
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/jid.1576 Link to full text; subscription required (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:22:y:2010:i:4:p:411-423

DOI: 10.1002/jid.1576

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of International Development is currently edited by Paul Mosley and Hazel Johnson

More articles in Journal of International Development from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:22:y:2010:i:4:p:411-423