 How interest groups lobby to influence budget outcomes in ZambiaSamuel M. Bwalya, Ezekiel Phiri and Kelvin Mpembamoto Journal of International Development, 2011, vol. 23, issue 3, 420-442 Abstract: This paper examines the nature of state–business relations and how interest groups utilise the budget process to lobby for tax and expenditure policies in Zambia, using information compiled from budget proposals interest groups submit towards the budget and lobbying activity data published in the daily newspapers between 2006 and 2008. The data shows a significant increase in interest groups formed especially in the civil society segmented and improvements in state–business relations, although not formalised and institutionalised, since political liberalisation in 1991. Analysis of lobbying data indicates that interest groups utilise the formal budget processes and informal policy networks such as the media to lobby unilaterally and collectively for favourable tax and expenditure policies. Tax proposals submitted through government departments had a greater chance of being adopted in the budget as bureaucrats assisted to shepherd them through the budget process. Copyright (C) 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Keywords: interest groups; lobbying; state–business relations; budget process; Zambia; D72; H30 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:23:y:2011:i:3:p:420-442 Access Statistics for this article Journal of International Development is currently edited by Paul Mosley and Hazel Johnson More articles in Journal of International Development from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
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