The Role and Responsibility of Foreign Aid in Recipient Political Settlements

Pablo Yanguas

Journal of International Development, 2017, vol. 29, issue 2, 211-228

Abstract: This article revisits the basic concept of political settlement by using an incumbent–challenger ideal type, and defines the mechanisms through which a settlement is influenced by foreign aid: diffusion, legitimation and brokerage. The new framework illustrates how aid may support continuity or change and allows for an interrogation of the ethical implications of donor choices. Challenging the implicit utilitarianism prevalent in current agendas and practices in the development community, this analysis highlights the inescapable value judgements that must guide international assistance, despite the significant structural incentives to focus on supposedly calculable risks and results. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2017
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:29:y:2017:i:2:p:211-228

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of International Development is currently edited by Paul Mosley and Hazel Johnson

More articles in Journal of International Development from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().