The turnpike property for dynamic discrete time zero‐sum games

Alexander J. Zaslavski

Abstract and Applied Analysis, 1999, vol. 4, issue 1, 21-48

Abstract: We consider a class of dynamic discrete‐time two‐player zero‐sum games. We show that for a generic cost function and each initial state, there exists a pair of overtaking equilibria strategies over an infinite horizon. We also establish that for a generic cost function f, there exists a pair of stationary equilibria strategies (xf, yf) such that each pair of “approximate” equilibria strategies spends almost all of its time in a small neighborhood of (xf, yf).

Date: 1999
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https://doi.org/10.1155/S1085337599000020

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jnlaaa:v:4:y:1999:i:1:p:21-48

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