The Core and Nucleolus in a Model of Information Transferal

Dongshuang Hou and Theo Driessen

Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2012, vol. 2012, issue 1

Abstract: Galdeano et al. introduced the so‐called information market game involving n identical firms acquiring a new technology owned by an innovator. For this specific cooperative game, the nucleolus is determined through a characterization of the symmetrical part of the core. The nonemptiness of the (symmetrical) core is shown to be equivalent to one of each, super additivity, zero‐monotonicity, or monotonicity.

Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jnljam:v:2012:y:2012:i:1:n:379848

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