Learning in General Games with Nature’s Moves

Patrick L. Leoni

Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2014, vol. 2014, issue 1

Abstract: This paper investigates simultaneous learning about both nature and others’ actions in repeated games and identifies a set of sufficient conditions for which Harsanyi’s doctrine holds. Players have a utility function over infinite histories that are continuous for the sup‐norm topology. Nature’s drawing after any history may depend on any past actions. Provided that (1) every player maximizes her expected payoff against her own beliefs, (2) every player updates her beliefs in a Bayesian manner, (3) prior beliefs about both nature and other players’ strategies have a grain of truth, and (4) beliefs about nature are independent of actions chosen during the game, we construct a Nash equilibrium, that is, realization‐equivalent to the actual plays, where Harsanyi’s doctrine holds. Those assumptions are shown to be tight.

Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/453168

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jnljam:v:2014:y:2014:i:1:n:453168

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Applied Mathematics from John Wiley & Sons
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().