Games under Ambiguous Payoffs and Optimistic Attitudes

Wei Xiong

Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2014, vol. 2014, issue 1

Abstract: In real‐life games, the consequence or payoff of a strategy profile and a player′s belief about the consequence of a strategy profile are often ambiguous, and players may have different optimistic attitudes with respect to a strategy profile. To handle this problem, this paper proposes a decision rule using the Hurwicz criterion and Dempster‐Shafer theory. Based on this rule, we introduce a new kind of games, called ambiguous games, and propose a solution concept that is appropriate for this sort of games. Moreover, we also study how the beliefs regarding possible payoffs and optimistic attitudes may affect the solutions of such a game. To illustrate our model, we provide an analysis of a scenario concerning allocating resource of defending and attacking in military contexts.

Date: 2014
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https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/531987

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jnljam:v:2014:y:2014:i:1:n:531987

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