Cooperation and Game between Producers and Managers Based on the Linear Contract

Xianglan Wan

Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2014, vol. 2014, issue 1

Abstract: There is a cooperative game between the manager and the producer in the enterprise. In this paper, we firstly construct the cooperative game model based on the principal‐agent theory. Under the conditions of Nash equilibrium and linear contract, the paper calculates the net income of the client, the total risk and welfare of the agents when the agents have the cooperation or not. The result shows that the correlation coefficient between their output has a direct relationship with the cooperation. Secondly, according to the power distribution theory another model is developed. We analyze the game process and critical state. Furthermore, we deduce the share proportion of the profit and the control size when they have the cooperation. Finally, we summarize all the research achievements, which are of universal significance for the practical cooperation game problems.

Date: 2014
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https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/547136

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jnljam:v:2014:y:2014:i:1:n:547136

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