A Cooperative Dual to the Nash Equilibrium for Two‐Person Prescriptive Games

H. W. Corley and Phantipa Kwain

Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2014, vol. 2014, issue 1

Abstract: An alternative to the Nash equilibrium (NE) is presented for two‐person, one‐shot prescriptive games in normal form, where the outcome is determined by an arbiter. The NE is the fundamental solution concept in noncooperative game theory. It is based on the assumption that players are completely selfish. However, NEs are often not played in practice, so we present a cooperative dual as an alternative solution concept by which an arbiter can assign the players′ actions. In this dual equilibrium (DE), each player acts in the other′s best interest. We formally define prescriptive games and the DE, then summarize the duality relationships between the NE and DE for two players. We also apply the DE to some prescriptive games and compare it to other outcomes.

Date: 2014
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https://doi.org/10.1155/2014/806794

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jnljam:v:2014:y:2014:i:1:n:806794

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