Psychological obstacles to administrative responsibility: Lessons of the MOVE disaster

Jack H. Nagel
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Jack H. Nagel: Professor of Political Science and Public Policy and Management at the University of Pennsylvania, Postal: Professor of Political Science and Public Policy and Management at the University of Pennsylvania

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1991, vol. 10, issue 1, 1-23

Abstract: Investigative bodies and other observers have attributed much of the blame for the 1985 MOVE catastrophe in Philadelphia to ineffective management by the city's previously successful mayor, W. Wilson Goode. Goode's behavior toward the disruptive extremist group followed two patterns, both paradoxical: protracted delay followed by excessive haste, and arms-length action that contrasted sharply with his usual hands-on management style. Drawing on the theory of decisionmaking developed by Irving Janis and Leon Mann, this paper suggests that both paradoxes resulted from unresolved decisional conflicts that impeded responsible and rational handling of the problem. The case points to the value of devoting more attention to the psychology of decision-making in educating present and future public managers.

Date: 1991
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:10:y:1991:i:1:p:1-23

DOI: 10.2307/3325510

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