Domestic politics and the strategy of international trade

Frederick W. Mayer
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Frederick W. Mayer: Assistant Professor of Public Policy Studies at Duke University, Postal: Assistant Professor of Public Policy Studies at Duke University

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1991, vol. 10, issue 2, 222-246

Abstract: The policymaking problem in international trade is fundamentally strategic, since optimal national policy depends on what other nations choose to do. The game is not between unitary rational actors, however, but rather between players with considerable internal divisions about what policy should be. There is a rich domestic politics to international trade policymaking. Conventional wisdom holds that internal division is a liability in international interactions. This article demonstrates that if countries are divided internally between divergent interests, this will alter the outcome of strategic games between countries in, for example, setting tariffs. In particular, internal division can actually be helpful to a country, since a protectionist faction helps to make a protectionist threat more credible.

Date: 1991
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:10:y:1991:i:2:p:222-246

DOI: 10.2307/3325173

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