Improving compliance with state environmental regulations

Raymond J. Burby and Robert G. Paterson

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1993, vol. 12, issue 4, 753-772

Abstract: This article reports on empirical tests of two theories for improving compliance with state environmental regulations. One theory argues for centralization of enforcement responsibilities with state agencies, while the other focuses on enforcement strategies, arguing for an approach that emphasizes capacity building and the social and moral bases of compliance in addition to deterrence and the threatened application of sanctions. Using evidence from North Carolina, we show that centralization does not necessarily enhance compliance, but cooperative enforcement strategies can improve the effectiveness of regulations that seek to attain performance standards. Compliance with simpler specification standards, however, can be attained just as well with easier to administer deterrent enforcement strategies based on frequent inspections and adequate sanctions.

Date: 1993
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:12:y:1993:i:4:p:753-772

DOI: 10.2307/3325349

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