International agencies and the art of the possible: The case of the IEA

Robert O. Keohane

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1982, vol. 1, issue 4, 469-481

Abstract: Although contemporary international organizations are often perceived as rule-making and rule-enforcing bodies, their more important function is to serve as facilitators of agreement among governments. Actions of the International Energy Agency during 1979-1980 illustrate this point. In the oil crises of those years, the IEA did not make use of its formal emergency powers, nor did it develop new sets of rules governing state action. Instead, it engaged in extensive informal negotiations designed to persuade governments and oil companies to restrain demand for oil, help to redistribute shortages equitably, and manage oil stocks in a stabilizing manner. This emphasis on informal bargaining reflected a sophisticated awareness, on the part of the IEA secretariat and many governmental representatives, both of the constraints on international organizations and of their value as a catalyst for coalitions of public and private officials. International organizations do not transform the interstate system; but they can contribute, at the margin, to increased cooperation.

Date: 1982
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:1:y:1982:i:4:p:469-481

DOI: 10.2307/3324776

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