Voting on public spending: Differences between public employees, transfer recipients, and private workers

Edward Gramlich and Daniel L. Rubinfeld

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1982, vol. 1, issue 4, 516-533

Abstract: Politicians who support higher public spending in the hope of gaining the support of transfer recipients, such as the aged, the unemployed, and those on welfare, have no reason to believe that the strategy will succeed; according to the evidence reviewed here, transfer recipients do not vote much differently on such issues from other voters. State and local employees have shown a clear preference for higher public spending, but their numbers are limited and the relative strength of their preference weak, so that their impact on voting outcomes has been only marginal.

Date: 1982
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:1:y:1982:i:4:p:516-533

DOI: 10.2307/3324780

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