Hospital selective contracting without consumer choice: What can we learn from Medi-Cal?

Anil Bamezai, Glenn A. Melnick, Joyce M. Mann and Jack Zwanziger
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Anil Bamezai: RAND, Santa Monica, California, Postal: RAND, Santa Monica, California

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2003, vol. 22, issue 1, 65-84

Abstract: In the selective contracting era, consumer choice has generally been absent in most state Medicaid programs, including California's (called Medi-Cal). In a setting where beneficiary exit is not a threat, a large payer may have both the incentives and the ability to exercise undue market power, potentially exposing an already vulnerable population to further harm. The analyses presented here of Medi-Cal contracting data, however, do not yield compelling evidence in favor of the undue market power hypothesis. Instead, hospital competition appears to explain with greater consistency why certain hospitals choose to contract with Medi-Cal while others do not, the trends in inpatient prices paid by Medi-Cal over time, and the effect of price competition on service cutbacks, such as emergency room closures. © 2003 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

Date: 2003
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:22:y:2003:i:1:p:65-84

DOI: 10.1002/pam.10096

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