Should you turn yourself in? The consequences of environmental self-policing

Sarah L. Stafford
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Sarah L. Stafford: The College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA, Postal: The College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, VA

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2007, vol. 26, issue 2, 305-326

Abstract: Facilities that self-police under the Environmental Protection Agency's Audit Policy are eligible for reduced penalties on disclosed violations. This paper investigates whether self-policing has additional consequences; in particular, whether self-policing reduces future enforcement activity. Using data on U.S. hazardous waste enforcement and disclosures, I find that facilities that self-police are rewarded with a lower probability of inspection in the future, although facilities with good compliance records receive a smaller benefit than facilities with poor records. Additionally, facilities that are inspected frequently are more likely to disclose than facilities that face a low probability of inspection. The results suggest that facilities may be able to strategically disclose in order to decrease future enforcement. © 2007 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:26:y:2007:i:2:p:305-326

DOI: 10.1002/pam.20249

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