Is self-regulation possible?

Jack N. Barkenbus

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1982, vol. 2, issue 4, 576-588

Abstract: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's increasingly prescriptive regulation of the nuclear industry can have deleterious effects, perhaps the most serious being the shift in responsibility for safety from the utility to the NRC. Several factors account for this type of regulation including the nature and structure of the nuclear industry, public opinion and bureaucratic incentives, and the nature of the technology itself. The opportunities to create heightened industry self-regulation (performance-based regulation) deserve further examination. The key to self-regulation is to structure incentives so that it is clearly within the nuclear utilities' interests to build and operate nuclear power facilities in the safest manner possible.

Date: 1982
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:2:y:1982:i:4:p:576-588

DOI: 10.2307/3323575

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