Government allocation of property rights: Who gets what?

Elizabeth S. Rolph
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Elizabeth S. Rolph: Researcher in the Political Science Department at the Rand Corporation, Postal: Researcher in the Political Science Department at the Rand Corporation

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1983, vol. 3, issue 1, 45-61

Abstract: It is widely believed that regulatory programs that confer property rights in the United States represent a device for transferring income from those with less political power to those with more. An analysis of twelve regulatory programs that confer such rights shows that programs do define and allocate property rights according to clearly visible rules; but the rules work to support the economic status quo. To satisfy this paramount political objective, policymakers may sacrifice efficiency. But there is no evidence that they intend these programs to shift wealth from a weaker to a stronger group.

Date: 1983
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:3:y:1983:i:1:p:45-61

DOI: 10.2307/3324004

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