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Managing the NATO alliance: Congress and burdensharing

Stanley R. Sloan

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1984, vol. 4, issue 3, 396-406

Abstract: The Congress has been an active partner in the transatlantic alliance from the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty to the present day. Congressional perpectives have been substantially influenced by the desire to limit the U.S. share of the NATO burden. In recent years, U.S.-European differences over East-West relations, Third World security requirements, and other issues have intensified the burdensharng debate. Now some members of Congress are once again using the threat of unilateral U.S. troop withdrawals from Europe-the main source of congressional influence on the alliance-to pressure the Europeans to increase their defense efforts. Whether the recent focus on burdensharing will recede or grow in the next few years will depend on how the administration and the allies respond to the congressional pressure. In any case, Congress is likely to continue to insist on its due share of management rights in the NATO relationship.

Date: 1984
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:4:y:1984:i:3:p:396-406

DOI: 10.2307/3324193

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