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Deregulatin and the courts

Cass Sunstein

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1986, vol. 5, issue 3, 517-534

Abstract: The recent deregulation movement has occupied not only executive agencies and Congress, but the courts as well. Legal challenges to deregulatory measures press traditional doctrines governing judicial review; the traditional role of the courts has been to fend off rather than to help bring about government regulation. These traditions, when joined with contemporary distrust of both regulation and the courts, account for a mounting belief that courts should take a deferential approach to deregulation. But such an approach would be misguided in light of the importance of judicial review in promoting agency adherence to statutes enacted by Congress and in guarding against factional influences over government. Judge-made doctrines can be developed to make it more likely that deregulation is consistent with law and does not reflect the disproportionate influence of politically powerful groups.

Date: 1986
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:5:y:1986:i:3:p:517-534

DOI: 10.1002/pam.4050050307

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