Cooperation and competition in public welfare policies

Edward Gramlich

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1987, vol. 6, issue 3, 417-431

Abstract: Present public welfare policies and various proposals for reforming them do not often exploit the advantages of cooperation between otherwise competing altruists. The article examines this principle from a number of perspectives. It shows first how the advantages of the existing cooperative payments structure could be lost in some widely-publicized welfare reform proposals, and it makes a suggestion for retaining these advantages. The article next shows how the same principle could be used to improve existing incentives for private giving. Finally, it uses the same logic to rationalize newly evolving notions of sharing responsibility between governments and the recipients themselves.

Date: 1987
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/3324853 Link to full text; subscription required (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:6:y:1987:i:3:p:417-431

DOI: 10.2307/3324853

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Journal of Policy Analysis and Management from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().