The underexamined assumptions of the invisible hand: Monetary incentives as policy instruments

Thomas W. Church and Milton Heumann

Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 1989, vol. 8, issue 4, 641-657

Abstract: To alleviate overcrowding in pretrial detention facilities, the City of New York established a program offering substantial budgetary increments to those district attorneys' offices in the city that reduced the number of long-term detainee cases. The experience with this program suggests that the inherent assuptions underlying a monetary incentive strategy-the existence of capacity, the avoidability of goal displacement, and the efficacy of financial rewards-need to be carefully examined if implementation is to be successful.

Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:8:y:1989:i:4:p:641-657

DOI: 10.2307/3325050

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