Competition and market power in the European airline industry: 1976-90

Purvez F. Captain and Robin Sickles
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Purvez F. Captain: Ernst and Young, LLP, Houston, TX, USA, Postal: Ernst and Young, LLP, Houston, TX, USA

Managerial and Decision Economics, 1997, vol. 18, issue 3, 209-225

Abstract: In this paper, we study the market power of European airlines in an oligopoly structure with product differentiation for the period 1976-1990 and test the monopoly hypothesis (Captain, 1993). The paper analyzes the level of competition among eight major European airlines and finds little evidence for market power in the industry over that period. One of our main findings is that the high prices in Europe are not entirely due to the bilateral agreements (leading to possible monopoly power), but rather are a result of very high cost structures in the industry. These results are broadly in agreement with those of Roeller and Sickles (1994) which analyzes these issues in the European Industry by estimating a structural, two-stage game. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:3:p:209-225

DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199705)18:3<209::AID-MDE803>3.0.CO;2-D

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