Firm ownership patterns and motives for voluntary pollution control

Jon D. Harford
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Jon D. Harford: Department of Economics, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH 44115, USA, Postal: Department of Economics, Cleveland State University, Cleveland, OH 44115, USA

Managerial and Decision Economics, 1997, vol. 18, issue 6, 421-431

Abstract: From the viewpoint of standard theory, firms have sometimes seemed to overcontrol pollution. However, Gordon (1990) and others have noted that the more diversified investors are the greater the degree of internalization of externalities. This paper explores the implications of diversification for the firm's choice of pollution in comparison with alternative explanations of voluntary pollution control, such as profit-seeking through regulatory influence, and altruism. The paper also addresses issues arising from the spatial aspects of pollution, and the relationship between stockholder and managerial incentives for pollution control. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:6:p:421-431

DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199709)18:6<421::AID-MDE844>3.0.CO;2-9

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