Schumpeterian competition and environmental R&D

John Scott

Managerial and Decision Economics, 1997, vol. 18, issue 6, 455-469

Abstract: Companies' emissions-reducing R&D investments increase in response to Schumpeterian competition-R&D rivalry among large firms-in the context of evolving emissions regulation. Estimation supports a theoretical role for emissions standards: to reduce negative externalities caused by hazardous air emissions, government can set standards that cause firms to accept the uncertainty of R&D. Furthermore, the pressure of R&D competition causes firms to increase their R&D investment. The paper uses primary data about manufacturers' emissions-reducing R&D. Responses to a questionnaire-mailed to the companies in the Business Week R&D Scoreboard sample for 1993-provide the new data about R&D to reduce the toxic air emissions of chemicals targeted in Title III of the 1990 Clean Air Act. The Act stimulated R&D investments by establishing the government's commitment to develop standards-which are still evolving-for the toxic chemicals. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:18:y:1997:i:6:p:455-469

DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199709)18:6<455::AID-MDE847>3.0.CO;2-M

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