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The impact of anti-takeover charter amendments on expectations of future earnings and takeover activity

Mark S. Johnson and Ramesh Rao ()
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Mark S. Johnson: Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA, Postal: Michigan State University, East Lansing, MI, USA

Managerial and Decision Economics, 1999, vol. 20, issue 2, 75-86

Abstract: In this study, additional evidence of the impact of anti-takeover amendments on firm earnings and subsequent takeover activity is presented. It is found that analysts' projections of financial performance measures do not appear to be altered by the adoption of anti-takeover amendments. Additionally, it is found that the anti-takeover charter amendments do not impact either takeover activity or takeover premiums following their adoption. Thus, anti-takeover amendments appear to have few, if any, consequences to shareholders. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1002/(SICI)1099-1468(199903)20:2<75::AID-MDE917>3.0.CO;2-Q

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