Enron, corporate governance and deterrence

Antony Dnes

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2005, vol. 26, issue 7, 421-429

Abstract: In this paper, I investigate the lessons from the financial scandals surrounding companies like Enron and WorldCom. These companies have generated concerns leading to the legal reform of corporate governance in America, and to the revision of voluntary, self-regulatory codes in Europe. The passage of time since the Enron debacle shows that critics were too quick to criticize, since the required adjustments have more the nature of minor adjustments to regulations. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2005
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:26:y:2005:i:7:p:421-429

DOI: 10.1002/mde.1255

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