Organisational susceptibility to fraud and theft, organizational size and the effectiveness of management controls: some UK evidence

Paul Barnes and Jill Webb
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Jill Webb: Leeds Business School, Leighton Hall, Beckett Park Campus, Leeds, UK, Postal: Leeds Business School, Leighton Hall, Beckett Park Campus, Leeds, UK

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2007, vol. 28, issue 3, 181-193

Abstract: This paper examines the principal determinants of an organization's susceptibility to theft and fraud in the context of a rational economic framework in which the level of protection is determined by the minimization of cost. The empirical study shows that, adjusting for differences in organizational type and industrial sector, both organizational susceptibility and the size of a typical theft or fraud increase with organizational size. Access to resources and the manner in which the theft or fraud is perpetrated are also important determinants of the money lost. However, they are unaffected by management controls or the nature of their violation. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:3:p:181-193

DOI: 10.1002/mde.1320

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