'Branded Generics' as a strategy to limit cannibalization of pharmaceutical markets

David Reiffen and Michael Ward ()
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David Reiffen: US Commodity Futures Trading Commission, USA, Postal: US Commodity Futures Trading Commission, USA

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2007, vol. 28, issue 4-5, 251-265

Abstract: This paper demonstrates how, by introducing a generic version of its previously patented product, a branded firm can influence the equilibrium in the generic segment of the market for the product. This in turn can increase the firm's profits from selling the branded version. We then use structural estimates from previous literature to calculate the magnitude of the effects in the generic and branded segments. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

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Related works:
Working Paper: “BRANDED GENERICS” AS A STRATEGY TO LIMIT CANNIBALIZATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:28:y:2007:i:4-5:p:251-265

DOI: 10.1002/mde.1339

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