Social Pressure at the Plate: Inequality Aversion, Status, and Mere Exposure

Brian Mills

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2014, vol. 35, issue 6, 387-403

Abstract: This paper uses professional baseball data to evaluate the impact of social pressures on subjective decisions made by officials. Umpires show tendencies consistent with both centrality bias and favoritism toward players with higher status in the league. Results also indicate that the odds of a strike are lower for batters in close proximity to the official throughout the game. Implications extend beyond sport to issues regarding closeness of contact in employee–manager relationships and pay and promotions decisions in the workplace. Given the persistent monitoring of officials in professional baseball, this phenomenon could be more prevalent in less scrutinized positions in other industries. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:35:y:2014:i:6:p:387-403

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().