Cartel Detection in Procurement Markets

Kai Hüschelrath and Tobias Veith
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kai Hueschelrath

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2014, vol. 35, issue 6, 404-422

Abstract: Cartel detection is usually viewed as a key task of either competition authorities or compliance officials in firms with an elevated risk of cartelization. We argue that customers of hard‐core cartels can have both incentives and possibilities to detect such agreements on their own initiative through the use of market‐specific datasets. We apply a unique dataset of about 340,000 market transactions from 36 smaller and larger customers of German cement producers and show that a price screen would have allowed particularly larger customers to detect the upstream cement cartel before the competition authority. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/

Related works:
Working Paper: Cartel detection in procurement markets (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:35:y:2014:i:6:p:404-422

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().