Aggressiveness of Managers in the Market with Network Effects: The Case of Biased Managers as Strategic Commitment

Yasuhiko Nakamura

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2016, vol. 37, issue 7, 495-506

Abstract: This paper analyzes a model wherein firms' owners hire biased managers in a differentiated goods duopoly with network effects. We show that whether firms hire an aggressive manager or not depends on both the degree of product differentiation and the strength of network effects in price competition whereas it does not depend on the degree of product differentiation or the strength of network effects in quantity competition. Thus, the attitudes of firms' managers depend on the type of competition and the relative magnitude of the strength of network effects to the degree of product differentiation. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:37:y:2016:i:7:p:495-506

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