Will American Needle Burst the NFL's Balloon?

Roger D. Blair, Roger D. Blair and Wenche Wang
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Roger D Blair

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2017, vol. 38, issue 5, 664-675

Abstract: For decades, the National Football League pooled their intellectual property and issued nonexclusive blanket licenses. No one complained. When the National Football League decided to award an exclusive license to Reebok for headwear production, one of the former licensees, American Needle, filed suit. In this paper, we analyze the competitive significance of exclusive licensing as well as joint marketing of trademark licenses. We suggest that the decision to issue an exclusive license has no anticompetitive potential. Pooling the thirty‐two clubs' trademarks, however, cast potential anticompetitive problems. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:38:y:2017:i:5:p:664-675

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