No Seat at the Table: Representation in Collective Bargaining in Professional Sports

Roger Blair and Jason Winfree

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2017, vol. 38, issue 5, 697-703

Abstract: This study analyzes representation in collective bargaining in professional sports leagues and shows that the labor market is not completely competitive off‐the‐field. Because collective bargaining impacts future compensation and player unions are always represented by current players and often represented by more experienced players, there is a much higher incentive to advocate for policies that increase pay for more experienced players. Conversely, policies that maintain monopsony power for leagues with regards to inexperienced players, such as player drafts, have remained in sports leagues. However, these policies may also restrict the quantity demanded for more experienced players. This paper provides a theoretical model and examines empirical evidence regarding the differences between younger and older players. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2017
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:38:y:2017:i:5:p:697-703

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