Hired to be Fired: The Publicity Value of Managers

John Bradbury

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2017, vol. 38, issue 7, 929-940

Abstract: Sports teams frequently fire and hire managers when they experience losing. However, determining managerial responsibility for player performance is difficult to measure. This study examines how major‐league baseball players perform under different managers and estimates that managers have little effect on performance. The study further investigates whether or not replacing managers serves as a signal to fans that the team is improving, which boosts attendance. The results indicate that new managers were associated with increased attendance in the 2000s; however, such effects were not present in the 1980s and 1990s. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Date: 2017
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