Peer pressure and social comparisons with heterogeneous ability

Aurélie Bonein ()

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2018, vol. 39, issue 2, 142-157

Abstract: When workers' efforts are not contractible, we investigate whether the display of workers' efforts to coworkers influences wage and effort decisions. We find that employers mainly increase the wages offered to the more valuable workers when they are observed that increases the difference in wages in such setting. We find evidence of peer pressure and strategic complementarity in efforts. Additionally, low†ability workers are more sensitive to peer pressure than their more productive coworkers, and these workers exert less effort with increases in the reciprocity of their coworkers. Finally, the display of workers' efforts to coworkers is detrimental to the employer's payoff but enhances efficiency.

Date: 2018
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2876

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Working Paper: Peer pressure and social comparisons with heterogeneous ability (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:39:y:2018:i:2:p:142-157

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