Contract duration and contractual learning: Evidence from franchising networks

Frédéric Perdreau, Magali Chaudey (), Odile Chanut and Muriel Fadairo

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2018, vol. 39, issue 2, 240-252

Abstract: Contract duration in franchising has generally been studied in frameworks where agents are assumed to have a high level of foresight. We complement existing studies by adopting a dynamic perspective that allows us to introduce a learning process in choice and adjustment of contract duration. On the basis of French panel data (1995–2003), collected from the yearbooks of the French Federation of Franchising, results of dynamic models are consistent with the existence of a learning process in the capacity to design appropriate contracts. Our study shows that certain factors, in particular too much franchising, may hinder the achievement of such a capability.

Date: 2018
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2899

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Working Paper: Contract duration and contractual learning: Evidence from franchising networks (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:39:y:2018:i:2:p:240-252

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