Cybercrime and cloud computing. A game theoretic network model

Florian Bartholomae ()

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2018, vol. 39, issue 3, 297-305

Abstract: In this paper, a network model is developed in which three players—a profit†maximizing provider of cloud computing services, its consumers, and a hacker—sequentially choose their strategies. Several scenarios with different levels of data security and public prosecution of the hacker are analyzed. Especially for the case when no security measurements are available, a firm's strategy to limit the network size in order to render hacking unattractive is discussed in detail. Finally, policy implications are given implying better international cooperation of the law enforcement authorities.

Date: 2018
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2904

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:39:y:2018:i:3:p:297-305

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