A reconsideration of the link between vertical externality and managerial incentives

Denis Claude ()

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2018, vol. 39, issue 5, 526-534

Abstract: Previous research revealed that the strategic role of delegation contracts disappears if two quantity†setting firms outsource input production to a monopolistic supplier. I show that this role is restored if the assumption of a downstream duopoly is relaxed. Thus, delegation contracts allow downstream profit†maximizing owners to commit their firms to a behavior that differs from their preferences. This behavior varies nonmonotonically with the number of firms in the downstream market. Corresponding deviations from profit maximization are larger if the upstream monopolist makes a price precommitment. But little to no deviation occurs if the number of firms is large.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:39:y:2018:i:5:p:526-534

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