Sabotaging in contests with monitoring efforts

Yizhaq Minchuk, Baruch Keren and Yossi Hadad

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2018, vol. 39, issue 6, 674-681

Abstract: This paper considers a 3‐stage contest with both sabotage and monitoring efforts that aim to reduce sabotage. In the first stage, the regulator sets his monitoring efforts for each contestant. In the second stage, each contestant determines his sabotaging efforts, based on the monitoring efforts that were imposed by the regulator. In the third stage, each contestant determines his productive efforts in the contest. The results supply a justification to exert monitoring efforts because these efforts may benefit both the contestants and the regulator (a win‐win situation). Furthermore, the paper defines the conditions where exerting monitoring efforts would be worthwhile.

Date: 2018
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.2937

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:39:y:2018:i:6:p:674-681

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