Antiscalping laws and the selling of season tickets by professional sports teams

Philippe Cyrenne

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2019, vol. 40, issue 6, 718-727

Abstract: This note highlights some issues related to the distribution of season tickets by professional sports teams. I first consider a number of alternative methods teams could use to sell season tickets. I argue that primary ticket sellers do not want their tickets used as investments assets; rather, they prefer game tickets be viewed as consumption assets. In examining these alternatives, I argue that season tickets can be viewed as a bundle of prepaid forward contracts, which have a convenience yield. This can help explain the apparent “underpricing” of game day tickets, team reselling policies, and antiscalping laws.

Date: 2019
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3039

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:40:y:2019:i:6:p:718-727

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