Academic scholarship, organization prestige, and the earnings of U.S. business school deans

Joao Faria, Daniel Gropper, Franklin Mixon and Julissa Y. Santoyo

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2019, vol. 40, issue 7, 823-837

Abstract: This study models the market for business school deans as an outcome of a differential game between a university's central administration and the job candidates in the market for business school deans. In our model, the ability of a business school dean to advance the organization is enhanced by his or her own scholarly reputation, such that a job candidate chooses an optimal level of scholarship that relates to his or her marketability. In this way, the supply of scholarship (by job candidates) can be seen as the supply of job candidates in the market for business school deans, whereas the demand for scholarship can be seen as the demand for business school deans. The main features of our game‐theoretic model are tested using data from both national and regional business schools and colleges in the U.S. Econometric results indicate that each additional scholarly contribution by a business school dean generates a wage premium ranging from $1,000 to $1,200, whereas in the case of national institutions, each additional student enrolled at the doctoral (master's) level raises the wage by $671 ($56). Lastly, the production of between nine and 10 scholarly contributions is found to be necessary in order to face a 50% probability of holding a business school deanship at a national institution, whereas production of about 37 scholarly contributions leads to a 50% probability of holding a deanship with a named business school at a national institution.

Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3048

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:40:y:2019:i:7:p:823-837

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().