The impact of political instability on risk‐taking in the banking sector: International evidence using a dynamic panel data model (System‐GMM)

Hamed Rezgallah, Nesrin Özataç and Salih Katircioğlu

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2019, vol. 40, issue 8, 891-906

Abstract: This paper contributes to the existing literature by investigating the impact of political instability risk on risk‐taking in the banking sector of 75 countries, which is the first attempt for this nexus to the best of our knowledge. The dynamic panel data model (System‐GMM) showed that political instability risk significantly increases risk‐taking in the banking sector. Besides, corruption levels and government ineffectiveness are the most important channels of political instability that affect the banking sector risk. The results also actively support the “too big to fail” hypothesis. Finally, the robustness results confirm the conclusions derived from the baseline System‐GMM model.

Date: 2019
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https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3075

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:40:y:2019:i:8:p:891-906

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