Organisational form and quality, service, and cleanliness inspection scores in restaurant franchise chains: Evidence from Spain
Pericles Ramón Mejía‐Vásquez and
Managerial and Decision Economics, 2020, vol. 41, issue 1, 106-115
This study investigates how the organisational form (company ownership vs. franchising) of individual restaurants of a large Spanish restaurant company influences their inspection scores in terms of quality, service, and cleanliness (QSC). The research uses a panel data set that includes bimonthly restaurant‐level data on QSC inspection scores. The aggregate data initially reveal substantial differences between company‐owned and franchised restaurants. Nevertheless, after controlling for other variables, we observe that such differences are in fact minor, or even nonexistent. In addition, when we endogenise the selection of the restaurants' organisational form, the differences become statistically insignificant.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:41:y:2020:i:1:p:106-115
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