Daniel Herbold and
Managerial and Decision Economics, 2020, vol. 41, issue 4, 490-502
This paper uses a repeated‐game model to study the retention of talented workers in the face of competition for talent. When the job benefits that workers value are non‐contractible, retention cannot be achieved by a sequence of spot contracts, but must be based on self‐enforcing long‐term agreements, which we call relational retention contracts. Retention then is successful only if workers trust their employers' promises. We demonstrate that relational contracts are valuable even if there are no incentive problems inside firms and that firms with a relatively low valuation for talent may be able to retain talented workers.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:41:y:2020:i:4:p:490-502
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