Relational retention

Daniel Herbold and Heiner Schumacher

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2020, vol. 41, issue 4, 490-502

Abstract: This paper uses a repeated‐game model to study the retention of talented workers in the face of competition for talent. When the job benefits that workers value are non‐contractible, retention cannot be achieved by a sequence of spot contracts, but must be based on self‐enforcing long‐term agreements, which we call relational retention contracts. Retention then is successful only if workers trust their employers' promises. We demonstrate that relational contracts are valuable even if there are no incentive problems inside firms and that firms with a relatively low valuation for talent may be able to retain talented workers.

Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3115

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:41:y:2020:i:4:p:490-502

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().