EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

A coordination mechanism through value‐added profit distribution in a supply chain considering corporate social responsibility

Yong Liu, Qian Xu and Zhi‐yang Liu

Managerial and Decision Economics, 2020, vol. 41, issue 4, 586-598

Abstract: The consumers pay more and more attention to corporate social responsibility (CSR), which has been a new competitiveness for the enterprises. This paper constructs a supply chain consisting of a dominated retailer, a socially responsible supplier and a non‐socially responsible supplier (compared with the socially responsible supplier), consider the consumer preference and exploit the game analysis technique to analyze the optimal decisions under the decentralized and concentrated decision, and then design a coordination mechanism based on value‐added profit distribution. The results show that compared with the decentralized decision, the retail price and order quantity of two products are lower, the CSR effort degree of socially responsible supplier is higher, and the performance of the whole supply chain is better under the concentrated decision. In addition, the mechanism designed can induce the socially responsible supplier to undertake CSR without damaging its profit, prompt the supply chain members to make the concentrated decisions, and promote the competitiveness of the retailer‐dominated supply chain.

Date: 2020
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1002/mde.3122

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:41:y:2020:i:4:p:586-598

Access Statistics for this article

Managerial and Decision Economics is currently edited by Antony Dnes

More articles in Managerial and Decision Economics from John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().

 
Page updated 2020-05-16
Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:41:y:2020:i:4:p:586-598